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Selling Chairman Mao:
Chinese Nationalism and the Cultural




Under Mao, nationalism, embedded in the rhetoric
of revolution, was the predominant source of loyalty to the
state. With the demise of Maoist leadership following his
death, and hastened by Deng Xiaoping’s de-Maoification
initiatives of the early 80s, a relative lack of commitment to
public, state-sponsored goals has become increasingly
apparent among the people of China. For the past twenty-
five years the Chinese Communist Party has struggled to
establish a new foundation for itself, which, in the absence
of revolutionary zeal, could serve the Party as an alternative
source of legitimacy. Since 1978, when Deng Xiaoping, at
the Eleventh Central Committee meeting, launched the first
reform initiative, the Party has staked its legitimacy on its
ability to guide China toward economic growth and material
prosperity.
In order to get ahead economically China has needed
to get along internationally, a course of action that has been
accompanied by significant, often unwanted consequences.
While the formula, “wealth follows openness,” has guided
China’s state policy throughout the 80s and 90s, at the heart
of reformist policy there is a worrisome dilemma that has
not escaped the attention of Party leadership. On the one
hand, the Party must anchor its legitimacy in national pride
and foster it through a China-first rhetoric. On the other hand,
in order for China to progress economically and thereby
demonstrate its competency, the party must continually
accommodate its policies to international treaties and
regulatory schemes—joining the WTO in 2001 for instance.
Consequently, the very thing that would provide evidence of
the Party’s successful transition to the modern age, namely,
economic growth, demands a genuine openness to the
international community that threatens both the political and
cultural cohesiveness of the nation. Put simply, when people
in Yunnan are wearing Reeboks, watching Friends and
drinking Sprite, will the Party’s “democratic dictatorship”
suffice?
But, of course, internationalization is much more
complex than this and its effects are often divergent. As
Jonathan Ungar has noted, “the very success of the current
thrust to make China rich and strong has begun to feed [a
different sort of] Chinese pride”1—a pride that is the result
not of public programs, but of private ventures. While the
entrepreneurial boldness of modern China must be seen as
the direct result of early 1990s admonitions to “not be too
cautious” in pursuing economic reform (the core principle
behind the eighth Five-Year Plan launched in 1991), and was
embodied best in Deng’s infamously pragmatic statement
about economic growth: that “It doesn’t matter if the cat is
black or white, as long as it catches mice,” through all of this
the Party has actively maneuvered to reclaim this new
entrepreneurial pride as its own creation. Attempts to use
technological and economic successes to foster national
solidarity have been numerous—seen perhaps most visibly,
and recently, in China’s space program and the PCR’s
successful bid to host the 2008 Olympics. But the pride
generated by China’s newfound economic development is
broadly viewed internally as less and less the result of state
programs, and more as the reward of individual
entrepreneurship. It is, in other words, the pursuit of personal
wealth and not a desire to “lift the nation” that increasingly
motivates these ventures.
The threat posed to Party leadership by increasing
individualism is clear: if the economy were to falter the
residual, often cynical loyalty that the Party now enjoys would
likely evaporate and blame for economic trouble would be
placed squarely on the shoulders of a political party that for
over a decade now has merely pretended to be socialist. The
charade, in other words, would be at an end and with it the
leadership of the CCP. As long as annual domestic growth
hovers near 9% the prospects of unseating the Party would
appear remote, but once the economy begins to stagnate,
Beijing’s leadership will become an obvious target. The Party,
in other words, is living on borrowed time, and it knows it.
As Sameena Ahmad stated in a recent article for The
Economist, “Domestically, the government is well aware that
its political acceptance derives solely from rapid economic
growth, and is willing do whatever is necessary to meet its
internal benchmark.”2 Consequently, as political controls
loosen and non-statist social forces assert themselves, the
state is losing its ability to define the content of nationalism.
As James Townsend observes, “the official gloss portraying
a united people striving together for China’s modernization
does not jibe with the realities of Chinese behavior.”3
In what follows, I will discuss the Chinese response
to these domestic changes and to a new set of internal and
external circumstances that occurred in the early nineties,
including the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and, of
course, the mass popular movements of 1989—not only in
Beijing but also in major urban centers across the country.
Rather than break with the past, as the Soviets had done, the
state had to find a way of transforming itself without
jettisoning the historical sources of its legitimacy. While the
Soviet Union could re-invent itself under the rubric of de-
Stalinization, China could not as readily “de-Maoize” since
Mao represented both the “Lenin” and the “Stalin” of
China.”4 His legacy could not be expunged without
endangering the ideological foundations of both the party
and the nation. An array of cultural responses—some
engineered by the state, but most produced by non-state
actors—arose in the wake of these events. Among these
responses, one of the most pervasive, and the one I will
discuss here, was the transformation of the image of
Chairman Mao. The Party had, of course, utilized Mao’s
image for many years, most notably during the years of the
Cultural Revolution, but the content of this symbol was
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changing. Faced with the dilemma of having to alter its
policies to meet the demands of an increasingly market driven
world and yet, at the same time, obliged to preserve the
continuity of its claim to leadership, the Party effectively
redefined the content of Mao’s symbolic representation
without altering the form of this symbol, namely, the Mao-
image itself. Mao was quickly re-mythologized by the Deng
leadership, turned into a patriarchal figurehead whose
Marxist, anti-market philosophy—now subject to a degree
of official public criticism—was replaced by a familial
devotion often expressed in an oddly pop-culture manner.
Mao the political theorist was being replaced by Mao the
founding father. In tandem with this, the Chinese leadership
repackaged Mao’s ideas as “preparatory” and “foundational,”
enabling the state to avoid the wholesale disposal of its
communist heritage by finessing Maoist doctrine in such a
way that, for instance, market economics could be relentlessly
pitched as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” To render
the transition from communism to capitalism seamless,
China’s leadership reshaped Mao’s legacy, gently bringing
it into line with an increasingly market oriented population
who likewise had to be convinced that, while “to get rich is
glorious,” to do so did not mean straying from Mao’s vision.
As I mentioned above, while the changing symbolic
meaning of the Mao-image was only partially orchestrated
by the state, much of the transformation was carried out by
the private sector which got caught up in the so-called
“Maocraze” of the early nineties. The undoubtedly complex
interplay between state policies regarding Mao’s legacy and
private sector fads covers far too much ground to examine
carefully in this paper, and the range of knowledge required
to do so is in any case, beyond my capacity. What I will do is
pose a few questions and hypotheses to suggest that the
selling of Mao in the 1990s helped preserve Party legitimacy
in the midst of economic globalization, and remains today
an important component of Chinese nationalism—fifty years
after the founding of the PRC.
Nationalism and Culturalism
Before I discuss how the representation of Mao in
the 1990s helped finesse Chinese national identity, it is
important to take a moment and be clear about what exactly
one means by a “nation.” One must bear in mind that nations
need not be thought of exclusively in terms of states. The
two terms have no internal or natural connection. Though
frequently associated, as in the use of the term “nation-state,”
this association is conventional, not essential. Consequently,
any discussion of the nation must bear in mind that, while
the state is fundamentally a mode of political organization,
the nation is primarily a cultural phenomenon—a group of
people who differentiate themselves from others on the basis
of a set of perceived cultural differences. While this is
certainly not to say that nations and national sentiment are
apolitical, certainly they are, it is nonetheless important to
recognize that nations are more deeply associated with a
people’s shared cultural self-understanding than they are with
political institutions or even citizenship. To the extent that
the nation is a necessity of state-building, its character is
ultimately determined by the practical need for the state to
represent something other than itself.
Having said this, however, the scholarly literature
on Chinese nationalism very often speaks of the nation as
being synonymous with the state. Scholarship concerning
the modern history of China repeatedly references the strong
and exceptionally durable cultural tradition that dominated
two thousand years of Chinese history. The pervasive
influence of this tradition on Chinese society is referred to
in the literature as “culturalism” and is generally discussed
in contrast to “nationalism” which, it is argued, does not
appear in China until the waning years of the Qing dynasty.
“The core proposition,” Townsend writes, “is that a set of
ideas labeled culturalism dominated traditional China, was
incompatible with modern nationalism, and yielded only
under the assault of imperialism and Western ideas to a new
nationalist way of thinking.”5 And as James Harrison
explains, “the traditional Chinese self-image has generally
been defined as culturalism, based on a common historical
heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs, not as nationalism,
based on the modern concept of the nation-state.”6 The
traditional Chinese self-image, therefore, attaches supreme
loyalty to the culture itself, not to the state, and thus “there
can be no justification for abandoning or even changing the
cultural tradition in order to strengthen the state.”7
While I will not spend time here discussing the
merits of this view or, for instance, whether it is indicative of
a sort of Chinese exceptionalism, it does seem that discussions
of Chinese nationalism have largely used the term culturalism
to substitute for, and to serve the same role as, nationalism.
Either way, and despite the notorious definitional confusion
concerning nationalism—that between “statists” and
“ethnicists,” for instance—I will follow Ernest Gellner’s
general sentiment that nationalism is the “striving to make
culture and polity congruent.”8
According to the literature, it is generally agreed
that the critical transition period from culturalism to
nationalism occurred in the late Qing and early Republican
periods, particularly the years between 1895, when defeat
by Japan galvanized Chinese patriotism, and 1919, when the
May Fourth movement brought culturalism to an end. The
recent post-Mao period, I would like to suggest, represents
an equally significant transition during which nationalism
was reconfigured in response to the increasingly “outward”
orientation of China during the 1980s and 90s, helping to
create a more confident, often assertive form of Chinese
nationalism which, among other things, has had to overcome
the residual prominence in communist doctrine of class
struggle and its considerable impact on national solidarity.
And one should not forget that the PRC is a multi-cultural,
even multi-national state with its non-Han Chinese
population, approximately 8% of its overall population,
divided officially among fifty-five minority nationalities—
some of which, like the Tibetans and, increasingly, the Muslim
minorities groups in the far west, brandish a strong ethnic
consciousness. But despite these exceptions, China has
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managed to transition out of the Maoist era and it has done
so, in part, by repackaging aspects of its national self-image.
The MaoCraze
I recall that in spring of 1992, while on my regular
bike ride into downtown Jinan, I was confronted by a set of
new, state-sanctioned billboards that had sprung up along
my route. They boasted of China’s unbroken 5,000-year
history (a history which less than two decades earlier, during
the height of the Cultural Revolution, was in the process of
being eradicated), and in the process of celebrating China’s
past these large signs graciously invited tourists to visit China
and see this history for themselves. But it struck me:
presumably these signs were not displayed for the benefit of
would-be foreign tourists who would have to already be
visiting China to see them. Instead, I suspect, these signs we
for internal eyes. I mention this because it is indicative of an
effort on the part of China to repackage itself, to brand itself
as an open nation committed to things international. But the
selling of China had to take place not only overseas, but at
home as well—indeed, in a small but telling event, the name
of the state’s Propaganda Department was recently changed
to the Publicity Department. And one of the ways in which
this repackaging was accomplished, as I have mentioned,
was to redefine the dominant symbols of Chinese nationalism
during the Mao years, but to do so without threatening the
legacy of communist China and, most importantly, the
political Party that had emerged from it.
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent
rollback of superpower influences throughout the developing
world, countries across the globe were been gripped by
renewed national aspirations and China found itself affected
by this global trend. The rapid dismantling of strict Maoist
ideological beliefs after 1991 and the undeniable end of the
communist era compelled Party leadership to draw upon
China’s long history, cultural heritage and other traditional
forms of national sentiment to serve as a new unifying
ideology. But despite these state sponsored initiatives, the
Party had lost much of its capacity to embody the spirit of
patriotism. By the mid-1990s patriotic sentiment was no
longer exclusively in the hands of the Party and its
propagandists, and soon symbols of national pride were
beginning to appear in non-state arenas, beyond the control
of official culture.
During this time, from the late 1980s and on into
the 90s, China experienced a nationwide revival of interest
in Mao which came to be known as the “MaoCraze.” Unlike
the first Mao craze of the Cultural Revolution, this one was
not heavily state sponsored, but was largely a popular
movement that rose from the streets. In the aftermath of both
Tiananmen and the Soviet Union’s demise, many within
China hungered for strong leadership and, more specifically,
for a powerful figure capable of guiding China through this
period of crisis. Put simply, China’s masses wished for a
leader who could to square off against the United States given
the pervasive belief that China would be forced to step into
the shoes left by the Soviets to play out the last chapter of
the Cold War. To an extent, the early ninety’s nostalgia for
Mao Zedong was a reflection of these mass sentiments; for
Mao was a figure who, despite his flaws, stood firm against
western influences. And while the collapse of Soviet Russia
was a political blow to China on the world stage, the social
and economic plight that Russia experienced soon after its
liberalization served as a potent reminder to those who
supported the 1989 student movement, that if China had
undergone a similarly sudden political change the nation may
well have succumbed to the same disorder that so quickly
devastated communist Russia.9
For the Party, the new enthusiasm for Mao’s image
was welcomed as a symbol of economic and social stability,
egalitarianism, and national pride at a time when, in addition
to external pressures, Chinese society was becoming
increasingly characterized by new set of class divisions. The
exact origins of the Mao Craze are uncertain, but most
commentators locate its inception in South China when
laminated images of the chairman began to appear hanging
from the rearview mirrors of trucks and taxis. The trend
caught on quickly and, and as Geremie Barmé explains, soon
spread throughout the country,
According to a story that was to become
one of China’s most widely told urban
myths, the driver of a vehicle involved in
a serious traffic accident in Shenzhen that
left a number of people dead, survived
unscathed because he had a picture of Mao
on the dashboard. . . . Shortly after the tale
began spreading, laminated images of Mao
appeared in vehicles in cities, towns and
villages throughout China.10
Mao’s image, in other words, was widely attributed with
powers of supernatural protection—a Saint Christopher of
the new China.
Following the appearance of these images and the
craze they started, the statistics regarding official portraits
indicate that not only were the people acquiring Mao’s
portraits at a remarkable rate, but in doing so were also
redefining the role of Mao Zedong would play in Chinese
social and political life. Regarding the dramatic increase in
the production of Mao images, Barmé reports that, while “in
1989 a mere 370,000 copies of the official portrait of Mao
had been printed. In 1990 the number rose dramatically 22.95
million, of which 19.93 million were sold. In 1991 and
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number hit 50 million.”11 And in addition to printed images,
Mao’s likeness appeared on everything from T-shirts to yo-
yos, and for a period of time CCTV even ran a Mao quiz
show. By the mid-1990s, however, the grassroots popularity
of Mao was being utilized by the business community in
marketing campaigns and product labeling. The Party acted
quickly to prevent this profiteering and in what I take to be a
direct attempt to preserve the veneration of Mao as a saint-
like figure as well as to prevent the popular interest in Mao
from turning into a passing fashion, the exploitation of Mao’s
image in advertising was officially banned in 1994 with the
passage of China’s advertising law.12 Although for those who
have been to Yangshou outside of Guilin, there was, in 1991,
and to the best of my knowledge still remains a café called
“Mickey Mao’s” which represents, for me at least, and early
and quintessential marketing of the Mao-image.
In conclusion, then, balancing the economic need
to engage the outside world with the political need to solidify
an internal patriotism remains the fundamental problem of
the post-Mao Communist Party. It is the often conflicting
need to remain internally coherent and externally opened that
has governed the perplexing rhetoric of the CCP during the
last 20 years. Remarking on this the China Daily, in a June
1991 quotes the then General Secretary, Jiang Zemin,
The creation of the road of building
socialism with Chinese characteristics and
the formation of its theory, line, and
policies indicate that China’s socialist
cause has entered a new stage of
development.13
And then, in what had become, and remains, a rhetorical
balancing act, China Daily, reported Jiang’s statement from
a March 1992 Politburo meeting:
To judge whether a move is ‘socialist’ or
‘capitalist’ will depend mainly on whether
it will benefit the development of the
productive forces under socialism, the
enhancement of the comprehensive
national strength of our socialist country
and the promotion of the living standard
of the people.14
The ironic cultural effect of this bifurcated agenda has been
the selling of Chairman Mao—that is, a fascination with the
quintessential image of national unity that is being fed by
the wholesale marketing of the Mao-image according to very
straightforward capitalist techniques. The blurring of Mao
with capitalism is the cultural effect of a political strategy
that seeks to accommodate both an outdated Communist
Party dogma and international capitalism. The result has been
a precarious equivocation. Terms have been redefined,
legacies have been reinterpreted, and histories have been
rewritten in a tenuous effort to keep the party leadership
and its doctrine relevant. Above all, it is the party’s fear of
succumbing to the same calamitous fate as the Soviet Union
that has forced it to embark on this hazardous rhetorical
strategy. The selling of Chairman Mao, although perhaps
not directed from Beijing, has been, and in many ways
continues to be, encouraged.
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